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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE TAX COIVIMISSION OF THE
STi-\.TE OF UTAH,
Appellant,

Case No.

vs.

7245

F. P. LINFORD, VOYLE B. BAR,BER
and RAYMOND PETERSON,

Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATE:MENT O·F FACTS

This is an appeal from an order of the 4th Judicial
District ·Court sustaining the demurrer to plaintiff's complaint and dismissing the action without leave to amend.
The facts which appellant believes give rise to a cause of
action, and as set forth in its complaint, are as follows:
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The appellant, State Tax C'ommission~ is a body politic
charged with the duty of collecting sales tax, Title 80, Chapter 15, Utah Code Annotated, 1943. On the 7th day of April,
1947, the respondents entered into an undertaking with
appellant whereby they would jointly and severally be liable
to the /people of the state of Utah in the sum of $1,000 lawful money of the United States.
That said obligation was upon the expressed condition
thereunder written, that as the bounden principal, the Orem
Motor Company, Inc., should well and truly comply with all
the provisions of the Sales Tax Act and any amendments
thereto, and in particular pay all taxes, interest and penalties promptly when due, in which case this obligation was
to be null and void; otherwise to remain in fuJI force and
effect.
That said obligation was upon the further condition
thereunder written, that upon failure of the principal, the
Orem Motor Company, Inc., to comply with any or all of the
provisions of the Sales Tax Act and any amendments thereto, that after demand by the State Tax Commission upon
the principal to comply with the provisions of said act and
to cease the violation and said principal should not perform
or cause to be performed all acts necessary to conform completely to the requirements of said act, then the State T'ax
Commission should within 60 days from the date when notice
and demand for payment of all taxes, interest and penalties
was made, give written notice to the sureties, postage prepaid to the last known address, of such violation by said principal and should make demand upon the sureties for the
payment of the amount of the default by said principal, up to
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but not to exceed the amount of the liability as defined by
this bond.
That pursuant to the provisions of Title 80, Chapter 15,
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, said principal, theOrem Motor
Company, Inc., should have filed a sales tax return for the
period November-December, 1947, and remitted the sales
tax shown to be due thereon; that said principal, the Orem
Motor Company, Inc., filed a sales tax return for the period
November-December, 1'947, but failed to remit the tax shown
to be due thereon in the sum of $808.24; therefore, penalty
in the amount of $80.32 and interest in the amount of $4.08
were assessed by the Tax Commission of the State of Utah
pursuant to the provisions of Title 80, Chapter 1:5, Utah
Code Annotated, 1943, the total sum being $893.14.
That on the 26th day of January, 1948, notice and
demand for payment within 10 days of the delinquent sales
tax due for the period above mentioned with penalty and
interest, the amount due being in the sum of $89~3-.14, was
made upon the principal, theOrem Motor ·Company, Inc.
That the Orem Motor Company, Inc., the principal on
the bond above mentioned, did not pay such delinquent sales
tax nor respond in any manner whatsoever to the notice
and demand for payment of the same within 10 days or at
any time up to the filing of the complaint.
·That on the 2·5th day of March, 19-48, payment not having been made in any amount on the sales tax owing by the
Orem Motor Company, Inc., notice and demand for payment
was made upon the defendants, F. P. Linford, Voyle B.
Barber and Raymond Peterson.
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That at the time of the filing of this complaint no part
of the sales tax delinquency has been paid by either the Orem
Motor Company, Inc., or the sureties on the bond which said
corporation filed as security for payment of the same (R. 1
and 2.).
The respondents demurred on the grounds :
That said complaint does not state a cause of action
against the defendants or either of them.
1.

2. That there is a defect or misjoinder of parties defendant.
3. That said complaint fails to allege that there was
any consideration for defendants' signing as surety for the
Orem Motor Company.
4. That said complaint fails to allege by what authority plaintiff accepted the written undertaking upon which
this suit is predicated (R. 4).
After argument the trial court sustained the demurrer
as to grounds 1, 3 and 4, and overruled the demurrer as to
ground 2·.
ASSIGNMEN'T O'F ERRORS

Appellant contends that the trial court in making its
decision er~ed in the following particulars :
(a) In sustaining the demurrer to appellant's complaint as to grounds 1, 3 and 4 and ordering the cause dismissed.
(b) In ordering the cause dismissed without leave to
amend.
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QUESTIONS PRE,SENTED
As appellant views this case, grounds 3 and 4, as set
forth in the demurrer, are not actually grounds for demurrer
but are reasons why the respondents consider that the
complaint, as filed, does not set forth a cause of action. The
primary question, therefore, to be decided by this Honorable Court is: Does the complaint as filed set forth a cause
of action against the respondents?

The trial court in considering the demurrer in this
case considered only the question as to whether the appellant, State Tax Commission, had authority to accept the
written undertaking upon which this suit is predicated.
(See memorandum decisions R. 13-15, and R. 2:3~26.) Inasmuch as there is nothing in the complaint which shows no
consideration was given, such defense, if valid at all, must
be taken by answer and not demurrer. It is felt that the
question of consideration may be overcome by amending
the complaint in the court below. Therefore, this question
need not be determined by this court.
It is believed, then, that this case may be settled by
answering the following questions :
1. Does the complaint, as filed, fail to state a cause
of action inasmuch as it fails to allege by what authority
appellant accepted the written undertaking upon which this
suit is predicated?
If the court should decide that such complaint is faulty
for this reason, it will then be necessary to answer a second
question.
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2. Does the appellant, State Tax Commission, have
authority to require the type of written undertaking upon
which this suit is predicated?
AR:GUMENT
Point 1.
Does the complaint as filed fail to state a cause of
action inasmuch as it fails to allege by what authority
appellant accepted the written undertaking upon which this
suit is predicated?
At the threshold of this argument, it should be observed
that the appellant takes the view it does have the authority
to require security to be given whenever it deems it necessary in order to insure compliance with the provisions of the
Emergency Revenue Act of 1933, as amended, and that the
bond involved herein is such security. However, we take the
view that, even though the State Tax Commission does not
have such authority, the complaint as filed sets forth a
cause of action against the respondents. It is the law in
this jurisdiction that a complaint is not vulnerable to a
general demurrer if, under its allegations, plaintiff may
prove such a state of facts and inferences as would withstand a motion for nonsuit. Eddington v. Union Portland
Cement Co., 42 Utah 274, 281, 130 Pac. 243.
While the question as to the effect to be given to a
written undertaking taken by a public officer in the absence
of specific statutory authority has not been decided by the
Supreme ~Court of the state of Utah, the almost uniform
authority holds that such an undertaking is not invalidated
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and the bond is valid as a common law obligation or as a
contractual obligation voluntarily undertaken.
In the early case of Central Banking and Security Co.
v. United States Fidelity and Gua.ranty Co. et al., 80 S. E.
121, the Supreme Court of West Virginia considered a situation wherein a clerk of the county court had, without statutory authority, taken a new bond from the administrator
of an estate. The validity of the bond was denied on account
of the lack of authority in the clerk of the county court to
take such bond. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia in summarizing the law in this situation said:
"As the statute nowhere confers upon the clerk
authority to take a new bond from a personal representative or other fiduciary, and makes it his duty to
report to the court the necessity thereof, it may well
be conceded he had no authority to take either of the
two substitute bonds, but their absolute invalidity
and worthlessness does not necessarily follow. Every
bond taken without authority in the officer who took
it is not void. Such bonds are often held good as
common-law obligations. Numerous authorities holding them void are cited in support of the cross-assignments of error, but the bonds in those cases were,
for the most part, held void because the taking thereof contravened a principle of public policy. Most of
them were recognizances under which officers had
discharged prisoners. One of them involved in Benedict v. Bray, 2 Cal. 251, 56 Am. D·ec. 332, was a void
attachment bond, but the opinion is unsatisfactory.
It assumes, contrary to almost uniform authority~
that all bonds, taken by officers not authorized to
take them, are void. T'he law on this subject was
summarized by Judge Green in Porter's Ex'r v.
Daniels, 11 W. Va. 250, in the following terms: 'The
mere fact that a bond not authorized by law has been
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taken by an officer does not render such bond invalid
at common law. Such bonds have been frequently
held void at common law, but wherever so held, it has
been not simply because taken by an officer without
authority, but for other and sufficient reasons appearing in each particular case-such as that they
were not voluntarily executed; that they were given
to the officer, to induce him to violate his duty as
such officer; or to induce him to perform a duty he
was bound to perform without the giving of such
bond; that the taking of the bond was oppressive,
and it was given without consideration; that the
obligee in the bond had no interest in the subjectmatter; that the taking of the bond was a violation
of public policy, or was executed under circumstances, or contained provisions, which would have
rendered a private bond void at law.' These bonds
were voluntarily given for consideration paid to the
sureties, and neither the acceptance nor the giving
of the same contravenes any principle of public
policy. Hence, they are clearly good as common-law
obligations."
The reasons why a bond taken without authority might
be held invalid as summarized in the opinion of Judge
Green are not present in the case at Bar. O,r, if present at
all, do not appear on the face of the complaint and, therefore, cannot be reached by a general demurrer. So far as
appears from the facts now before the court, the bond was
voluntarily executed. We take the view that if defendants
claim such bond not to have been voluntarily executed, such
defense must be taken by answer and not by demurrer.
Further, there is nothing to show that it was given to an
officer of the Tax ,Commission to induce him to violate his
duty, or to induce him to perform a duty he was bound to
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perform without the giving of such bond, the bond in this
case being exacted pursuant to 80-15-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which authorizes the commission "to require
any person subject to the tax imposed hereunder to deposit
with it such security as the Tax Commission may determine."
Nor can it be said that the taking of the bond was oppressive;
that it was given 'vithout consideration; that the obligee in
the bond had no interest in the subject-matter; that the
taking of the bond was a violation of public policy or executed
under circumstances or contained provisions which would
have rendered a private bond void at law.
The Supreme Court of Kansas in considering a similar
situation arrived at the same conclusion, i. e. that a bond
taken without statutory authority gives rise to a commonlaw obligation or a contractual obligation voluntarily undertaken. State ex rel Hendrick Co. Atty. v. Hartford Accident
& Indemnity Co., Hartford, Conn., 114 Pac. 2d 812. In that
case, the Supreme Court of Kansas was considering a situation wherein a juvenile court had required a person to whom
custody of a child was being given to deposit a bond with
the court, the bond being to insure the delivery of the child
upon order of the court. No statutory authority was given
to the juvenile court tq require such bond. The Supreme
Court in speaking with reference to the validity of a bond,
held:
"While the bonds not provided for by statute
and extorted by public officers, under color of their
office, are not enforceable, the general rule is that
the mere absence of specific statutory authority for
the giving of a bond does not invalidate a bond which
is given voluntarily and which is not in contraven-
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tion of public policy. It is valid as a common-law
obligation, or as a contractual obligation voluntarily
undertaken. 9 C. J. p. 29, sec. 45 and cases there
cited; 11 C. J. S., Bonds sec. 27; 8 Am. Jur. p. 721,
sec. 35; Constable v. National Steamship Co., 154
U.S. 51, 14 S. Ct. 1062, 38 L. Ed. 903, 916."
In view of these authorities, we take the view that the
complaint is not defective inasmuch as it fails to allege by
what authority the appellant accepted the written undertaking.
Point 2.
Does the appellant, State Tax Commission, have authority to require the, type, of written und:ertaking upon which
this suit is predicated?

The learned trial judge took the view that 80-15-5,
Utah 'Code Annotated, 1943, above quoted, does not vest
authority in the State Tax Commission to require the type
of security as is herein involved (R. 13-15 and R. '23-26).
Such view necessitated the sustaining of the demurrer without leave to amend.

(

Notwithstanding the fact that, as we view the law,
no allegation of authority is necessary in a suit of this type,
appellant takes the view and submits to the court that the
State Tax ·Commission o.f the state
Utah- does in-iact
h~ye __ a,~thority to requir~. the type of undertaking upon
which this suit is predicated.
·--

of

The State Tax Commission of the state of Utah is
vested with the responsibility of administering and enforcing the provisions of the Emergency Revenue Act of 1933.
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In the early administration of the Act, the Tax Commission
experienced considerable difficulty in collecting the sales
tax from certain retailers. Therefore, in its fourth biennial
report for the years 1937-1938, the Tax Commission recommended, among other things, that the collection procedure
be changed so as to ·allow the Commission to require the
posting of a bond. This recommendation, as found on page
38 of the fourth biennial report of the State Tiax ·Commission of Utah, for the years 1937-1938, reads as follows:
"There are certain changes which we consider
should be made in the present law in order to improve
the administration of the Act and to facilitate the
collection of the tax. These changes cover such items
* * * (2) collection procedure, including posting of bond; * * * (Italics supplied.)
"These proposed changes will be drafted into
proper bills and submitted to the legislature together
with complete explanations giving our reasons for
such changes."
A bill incorporating the proposed change to allow the
posting of a bond to insure collection procedure was prepared by the members of the Tax Commission and was
submitted to the Legislature. In response to this recommendation, the Emergency Revenue Act was amended by the
next session of the Legislature. (Laws of Utah, 1939, Chapter 103,); (80-15-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1943), so as to
include the following provisions :
"The state tax commission, whenever it deems
it necessary to insure compliance with the provisions
of this act, may require any person subject to the
tax imposed hereunder to deposit with it such security as the state tax commission may determine. The

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
same may be sold by the state tax commission at
public sale if it becomes necessary so to do in order
to recover any tax, interest or penalty due. Notice
of such sale may be served upon the person who
deposited such securities personally or by mail; if
by mail, notice sent to the last known address as the
same appears in the records of the state tax com. mission shall be sufficient for the purposes of this
requirement. Upon any such sale the surplus, if any,
above the amounts due under this act, shall be returned to the person who deposited the security."
After the Act was so amended, the Commission, pursuant to authority vested in it by 80-15-20, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, passed a regulation which reads as follows:
"8.

Bonds.
(Applies to sales tax only)

"In all cases where the ~~at::ta~:E!lllllJl~ion
dg_ems it _!!~~~~~ry to insure comprraTice with the
provisions of the act, vendors are required to post
a bond or other security as a condition to their obtaining a license under the Act Such bonds shall be
in the form and for such amounts as the state tax
commission deems appropriate under the particular
circumstances."
While this regulation was promulgated earlier, it was
first published effective January 1, 1944, and has been in
continuous effect since that time. Since the passing of the
amendment, the ·commission has uniformily required the
posting of a bond with either personal or corporate sureties.
The form of the bond as required by the Commission and
as executed and signed by the respondents, is as follows :
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BOND

OF

UTAH

RETAILER

EXECUTED PURSUANT TO DEMAND FOR SEC'UR 1TY
UNDER THE EMERGEN·CY REVENUE AIC'T O~F 19-33
AS AMENDED
1

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That we, ______ ----------------------------- ________ of_________________________________ _
(name)
(address)
_ __of______________________________________ ,
as principal, and ___________________ _
and _________________________________________ --------_---------of------------------------------------,
and _________________________________________________________ of------------------------------------,
as sureties, are jointly and severally held and firmly bound
unto the people of the State of Utah in the sum of _______________ _
----------------------------------------------------- ( $------------------------) Ia wful

money of the United States of America, for the payment
whereof well and truly to be made we bind ourselves, our
heirs, executors, successors and assigns, jointly and severally, firmly by these presents.
The condition of the foregoing obligation is such that,
WHEREAS, the above bounden principal has made application for a license to engage in business in Utah, pursuant to the provisions of the Emergency· Revenue Act of
1933, as amended, and that pursuant to the application a
license has been or is about to be issued ; and
WHEREAS, a demand has been made upon the principal by the State Tax Commission for security for the payment of the tax.
NOW, THEREFORE, if the above bounden principal
shall well and truly comply with all the provisions of said
Act and any amendments thereto, and in particular pay all
taxes, interest and penalties promptly when due, including
both taxes, interest and penalties now due and those which
may become due, then this obligation shall be null and void;
otherwise to remain in full force and effect.
Upon the failure of the principal herein to comply with
any or all of the provisions of said Act and any amendments
thereto, and in particular on the principal's failure to pay
all taxes, interest and penalties promptly when due and
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when demanded by the State Tax Commission, the State Tax
Commission shall within 60 days from the date when notice
and demand for paym.ent of all taxes, interest and penalties
was made give written notice to the sureties, postage prepaid to their last known address of such principal's failure
to comply with the provisions of said Act or of failure to
make payment of all taxes, interest and penalties due and
shall make demand upon the sureties for the payment of the
amount of the default by said principal, up to but not to
exceed the amount of their liability as defined by this bond,
and in addition any costs or attorneys fees incurred in collecting the same from said sureties.
)The surety or sureties herein reserve the right to withdraw as such sureties, except as to any liability already incurred or accrued hereunder, and may do so upon the giving
of written notice of such withdrawal to the State Tax Commission; provided, however, that no withdrawal shall be
effective for any purpose until thirty days shall have elapsed
from and after the receipt of such notice by said Commission,
and further provided that no withdrawal shall in anywise
affect the liability of said surety arising out of any sales
made by the principal herein prior to the expiration of such
period of thirty days, regardless of whether or not an assessment for tax due on the receipts from such sales has been
levied before the lapse of such thirty days.
Signed and sealed this ________________ day of__________________ ,
Principal
Surety
Surety
Surety
ATT'EST
B'Y--------------------------------------------------------
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15
·CORPORATE A·CKNO·WLEDGMENT OF PRINCIPAL
(TO BE EXEC·UT.ED BY C'ORPORA·TIO,NS. WIT'HOUT
CORPORATE SEAL)
STATE OF _________________ -------------}
COUNTY OF ----------------------------- SS.
On the ____________ day of ---------·- ______________ in the year ___________ _
before me personally appeared ________________________________________________,
to be known, who, being by me duly sworn, did depose and

say: That he reside in---------------------------------------------------------: that
he is the ----------------------------------------------- of the ________________________ ,
the corporation which executed the above instrument and
which is described therein; that he signed the above mentioned instrument on ·behalf of the said corporation; that
he was authorized to do so by Article ____________ of the Articles
of Incorporation of the said corporation, and by order of the
Board of Directors of said ·Corporation; and that his signature as it thus appears in the above instrument is binding
upon the corporation.
Notary Public
A·FFIDA VIT. BY SURETY
STATE 0 F UTAH ------------------------------}
CO·UNTY 0 F --------------------------------------- SS.
I, ___________ _: __________________________________, being duly sworn upon
oath, do depose and say that I am one of the sureties named
in the bond to which this Affidavit is attached, and that I
am a resident householder in ------------------------------------ County,
State of Utah, and that I am possessed in my own name of
real and personal property, other than my homestead, at
reasonable value in excess of $________________________________ , free and
clear of all encumbrances.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this ________________ day of
------ ___________________________________________ , 19--------·
My Commission Expires :
(SEA·L)

(Notary Public)
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Turning now to an analysis of the wording of 80-15-5,
Utah Code Annotated, .1943, we must first consider just
what is meant by the term "security." No comprehensive
and exact legal definition of the term "security" is possible.
It is possible to find most any definition desired and such
may be found in a relatively few pages by consulting volume
38, Words and Phrases, pages 469 to 487. One definition
which would support the definition of the Tax Commission
that a surety bond is a "security" is found in the case of
Storm v. Waddell, N. Y., 2 Sandf. Ch. 494, 507, citing 2
Bouv. Law Diet. 493, as set forth in 38 Words and Phrases,
1,71:

"'The term 'security' signifies that which makes
secure or certain. In its proper use it relates to
pecuniary matters, and often consists of a promise
or right unattended with possession of the thing
upon which it reposes. It implies in its con1mon acceptation that which prevents loss or makes safe.
Dr. Johnson defines it as .anything given as a pledge
or caution. Dean 8wift uses it as synonymous with
'safety' or 'certainty.' Webster defines it as anything
given or deposited to secure the payment of a debt or
the performance of a contract, as a bond with surety,
a mortgage, the indorsement of a responsible man,
or a pledge. It is that which renders a matter sure;
and instrument which renders certain the performance of a contract." (Italics supplied.)
Also significant are the following:
"The addition of the word 'security' to the signature of a bond shows prima facie that the person
signing is a surety. Boulware v. Hartsook's Adm'r,
3 S. E. 289, 291, 83 Va. 679, citing Harper's Adm'r
v. McVeigh's Adm'r, 1 S. E'. 193, 82 Va. 751.
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"In Code section authorizing court, upon 'security' being first given, to open judgment entered for
want of affidavit of defense, word 'security' is used
in sense of 'surety'; that is, bond with surety or
sureties. Rev. Code 1915, 4169. Penn. Central Light
& Pmver Co. v. Central Eastern Power Co., 171 A.
332, 6 lV. W. Harr. 74.
"The word 'security' is often used in the Code
in the sense of 'surety.' Thus the applicant for an
attachment must give bond with good security, and
one filing a claim to property levied on, in order to
replevy the property, must give bond with good and
sufficient security, so that the word 'security' as
used in the phrase 'and to give security for the
eventual condemnation money,' appearing in section
4819 of the Civil Code, which pro~ides for entering
a defense to the levy of a distress warrant, means
that the defendant in such warrant must give a bond
with a surety or sureties thereon, and the levying
officer is not authorized to take in lieu of such bond
a deposit of money. Goggins v. Jones, 41 S. E. 995,
996, 115 Ga. 596."

We submit that the appellant, State T'ax ·Commission,
has made a practical interpretation of the statute involved
and that its view of the term "security" being a bond is
proper in view of the definition of "security'" as herein set
forth and particularly in view of the fact that the change
made in 80-15-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, was made
upon the recommendation and_ advice of the T'ax ·Commission. The Tax ·Commission, by long administrative interpretation, has always considered the word "security" to mean
a bond with either personal or corporate sureties. It is admittedly true that a misinterpretation of the statute gives
no regularity to such interpretation; however, the Supreme
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Court of Utah, in the case of Board of State Land Commissioners v. Ririe (1920), 56 Utah 213, 190 Pac. 59, said:
"While it is true that the construction of a statute by the executive department is not binding upon
the courts, it is, nevertheless, also true, and is so
determined by the overwhelming weight of authority,
that unless such construction does violence to the
apparent intent of the language used it is entitled
to serious consideration by the courts, and especially
so if the statute has been in force for any great
length of time and has been so construed."
This statement of the law was acquiesced in by this
court in In re Cowan's Estate, (1940) 98 U. 393, 99 Pac. 2d
605, and was reaffirmed in the case of Utah Concrete Products Co. v. State Tax Commission (1942), 101 U. 513, 125
Pac. 2d 408, and E. C. Olsen Co. v. State Tax Commission,
168 Pac. 2d 332.
The interpretation placed by the State Tax Commission upon the word "security" has been in effect since 1939
when the Emergency Revenue Act of 1933 was amended
to allow the Commission to require security. And it is submitted such interpretation does no violence to the apparent
intent of the language, the intent being to make sure or certain that provisions of the Emergency Revenue Act of 1'933
will be complied with by the principal. The Commission has
made the determination pursuant to authority vested in it
by 80-15·-5, Utah ·code Annotated, 1943, that such bond
shall be deemed sufficient security.
;

I

It should be noted that in the nine years this provision
has been in effect many hundreds of taxpayers have been
required to post this type of bond with the ·Tax Commission,
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and, further, that there are at the present time many such
bonds posted with the Tax Commission to assure compliance
with the provisions of the Act. We think that it is a reasonable inference from Regulation #8, 80-15-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, and from the form of the bond as written, that
the primary reason for requiring a vendor to post a bond
is to insure that the tax collected will be paid and that the
only cases in which a bond would be required are cases wherein the principal is in a precarious financial circumstance, or
the nature of his business is such that he will incur a large
tax liability, in which case, a sudden financial reverse would
cause a loss of tax collected.
The Tax ·Commission in dealing with taxpayers has
found it necessary to require this type of security. We believe that in view of the type of taxpayer from whom security
is required-that is taxpayers in precarious financial circumstances, or taxpayers incurring large tax liabilities-in
the great majority of cases, the taxpayer who is required '\,
to post security is financially not in a position to deposit
any other type of security with the Tax Commission. Certainly a taxpayer who is in sufficiently difficult financial
circumstances that the Commission deems it necessary to
require him to post security to insure compliance with the
Act, is not in a position to deposit negotiable instrument~,,.
stocks, bonds, etc., which might be sold in strict compliance
with the wording of the Act. To place such an interpretation
on the languag~ contained in 80-15-5, Utah Code Annotated,
1943, we submit, is not a practical interpretation of the
statute. Furthermore, there are a limited number of cases
in which the vendor when required to post a bond desires
.
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for one reason or another to post cash in lieu thereof. While
the issues in this case are not concerned with the posting
of a cash bond, we call the court's attention to the fact that
such bonds are posted and certainly it would be an impractical interpretation of the statute to require a taxpayer
desiring to post a cash bond to purchase negotiable securities which might decline in value. Such risk should not be
imposed upon a taxpayer.
The court below in making an analysis of the wording
of 80-15-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, took the view that
the remedy therein provided, that is, selling the security at
public sale in order to secure any tax, was the only remedy
(R. 14). With such interpretation we most respectfully disagree. The words of the statute "'The same may be sold by
the Tax Commission at public sale if it became necessary
so to do in order to recover any tax, interest or penalty
* * *"as we view them, are permissive or directory and
not mandatory or exclusive.
1

80-5-46, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which outlines the

powers and duties of the Utah State T·ax Commission, among
other things, authorizes the Commission "to sue and be sued
in its own name." This court in the case of the State Tax
Commission v. City of Logan (1936), 88 Utah 406, 54 Pac.
2d 1197, in construing the general powers of the T:ax Commission to sue and be sued, said :

"* * * Article 13, Sec. 11, of our State Constitution grants to the State Tax Commission supervision of the tax laws of the state. R. S. Utah 1933,
80-5-46, contains an enumeration of the general
powers and duties of the Commission. Power is there
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conferred upon the Commission 'to sue and be sued
in its own name,' and generally to supervise and
direct the levy and collection of taxes. In the light of
the fact that broad powers are conferred upon the
Commission to levy and collect taxes, it would seem
idle for the legislature to vest authority in the Commission to sue in its own name unless it intended
thereby that the Commission might sue for the collection of taxes. Apparently one of the chief purposes
of the legislatu're in granting to the Commission
autho'Jity to sue was to enable it to enforce payment
of taxes. The city's contention that the Commission
is without authority to prosecute this action in its
own name must fail." (Italics supplied.)
This reasoning was set forth by the court in spite of the
fact that section 11 of the Emergency Revenue Act of 19-3'3,
as it was in effect when the case arose, provided specifically
that the sales tax could be collected by appropriate judicial
proceedings.
Therefore, we contend that the State T'ax Commission
having the power to sue in its own name may sue the respondents in this case for the collection of the sales tax which the
respondents have incurred a liability to pay by reason of the
default of the principal.
I

There is one further principle which appellant feels
should be considered by the court in making a determination as to the question of the authority of the Commission
requiring posting of a bond. The section of the statute
relied upon by the Commission, 80-15·-5, Utah Code Annotated, 194,3, was amended by the Laws of Utah, chapter
103 to include the provision hereinbefore quoted. No further
amendment was made until the 1947 session of the legisla-
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ture (H. B. #48, approved February 24). The amendment
passed made no change in that portion of 80~15-5, Utah ·Code
Annotated, 1943, upon which the ·Commission relies as having authority to require the posting of a bond. Inasmuch
as the practice of the Commission in requiring bonds was
adopted shortly after the 1939· amendment and such construction was adopted by regulation and promulgated to
the public and, further, since the public has come to rely
on such regulation, we submit that the legislature knew of
such ·construction and adopted it in re-enacting the statute.
This court recognizing this doctrine in the case of Utah
Power & Light Company v. Public Servic.e Commission
(1944), 107 Utah 55, 152 Pac. 2d 542 cited considerable
authority and held :
"Closely allied to this argument (administrative
construction) is the third argument in which the
Company seeks to invoke the principle of law that
when the legislature re-adopts a statute or act without change after uniform and notorious construction
by officers required to administer it the presumption
is that the legislature knew of such construction and
adopted it in re-enacting the statute. This doctrine
has been criticized (see 54 Harvard Law Review p.
1311, Article by A. H. Feller) but it nevertheless
is supported by considerable authority. State Board
of Land Commissioners v. Ririe, supra, 56 Utah 213,
190 P. 59; Van Veen v. Graham County, 13 Ariz.
167, 108 P. 252; City of Louisville v. Louisville School
Board, 119 Ky. 574, 84 S. W. 729; State v. Sheldon,
79 Neb. 455, 113 N. W. 208."
We submit that in the event this court should determine
that an allegation of authority be necessary in order to state
a cause of action, that the appellant, State T·ax Commission,
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should be allowed to amend its complaint and allege that the
bond was taken pursuant to the provisions of 80-1~5-5·, Utah·
Code Annotated, 1943.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, therefore, it is submitted that the complaint of appellant, as filed in the court below, sets forth
a cause of action against the respondents or may be amended
so as to state a cause of action.
We submit that the Tax Commission has placed a most
practical interpretation upon 80-15-5, Utah Code Annotated,
1943, and that to place any other interpretation thereon
would work a hardship upon the vendors who have come
to rely upon the Commission's regulation and who would be
required to deposit negotiable securities. Furthermore, we
submit that a holding that the Commission has authority to
require the type of security upon which this suit is predicated is a sine qua non to the successful administration of
the Emergency Revenue Act of 1933.
We urge that the posting of a surety bond with sufficient personal sureties, or a corporate surety, furnishes
adequate security to insure that the tax will be paid; that
the only purpose of requiring such security is to insure that
the tax will be paid, and, therefore, the Commission by requiring the posting of a surety bond of the nature upon
which this suit is predicated evidences a sufficient compliance with the terms of the Act.
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The appellant respectfully submits that the decision
of the lower court should be set aside and the case remanded
for further proceedings pursuant to law.
Respectfully submitted,

G. H:AL TAYLOR,
WAYNE CHRISTOFFERSEN,
Attorneys for Appellant.
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